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Abstract
Smart grids (SGs) promise to deliver dramatic improvements compared to traditional power grids
thanks primarily to the large amount of data being exchanged and processed within the grid, which
enables the grid to be monitored more accurately and at a much faster pace. The smart meter (SM) is
one of the key devices that enable the SG concept by monitoring a household’s electricity consumption
and reporting it to the utility provider (UP), i.e., the entity that sells energy to customers, or to the
distribution system operator (DSO), i.e., the entity that operates and manages the grid, with high
accuracy and at a much faster pace compared to traditional meters. However, the very availability of
rich and high-frequency household electricity consumption data, which enables a very efficient power
grid management, also opens up unprecedented challenges on data security and privacy. To counter
these threats, it is necessary to develop techniques that keep SM data private, and, for this reason, SM
privacy has become a very active research area. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of
the most significant privacy-preserving techniques for SM data, highlighting their main benefits and
disadvantages.
I. THE SG REVOLUTION
The SG refers to the set of technologies that have been developed to replace an increasingly
ageing power infrastructure. Thanks to an extensive use of information and communication
technologies and to the introduction of two-way communication links between the UPs and the
end customers, the SG allows for improved system reliability, better quality of power delivered
and more rapid response to outages and thefts. The SG market is rapidly evolving and is fuelled
by a rapid penetration of SG technologies all over the world, as well as by extensive investments,
ranging from USD 23.8 billion in 2018 to an estimated USD 61.3 billion by 2023, at a compound
annual growth rate of 20.9% [1].
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2Key to the SG development is the installation of SMs at the households’ premises, which
allow near real-time power consumption information to be recorded and sent to the UPs or to
the DSOs. SMs are the crucial elements in the SG revolution, as they send electricity consumption
measurements at a much higher resolution and with a higher accuracy compared to traditional
meters. SMs provide benefits for all parties in the SG. UPs are able to better understand and
control the needs of their customers, as well as adjust electricity price dynamically according to
short-term generation and consumption variations, being able to communicate this information to
the consumers instantly. Additionally, the UPs can generate more accurate bills while reducing the
need for back-office rebilling, detect energy theft and outages more rapidly, and implement load-
shaping techniques. DSOs are able to reduce operational costs and energy losses, improve grid
efficiency, system design and distributed system state estimation, and better allocate resources to
the current demand. Consumers themselves take advantage of SMs to monitor their consumption
in near real-time, leading to better consumption awareness and energy usage management.
Moreover, consumers are able to integrate microgeneration and energy storage devices into the
grid, detect failing appliances and waste of energy more quickly, notice expected or unexpected
activity, as well as migrate more easily between UPs. The SM market growth demonstrates the
value of these technologies, which are expected to reach USD 10.4 billion by 2022, with around
88 million SM installations taking place in 2017 [2]. In order to speed up SM adoption, many
countries have introduced legislation that enforces SM installations; for example, most European
Union countries need to reach 80% SM penetration rate by 2020 and 100% by 2022 [3].
The very property that allows SMs to deliver a much improved overall performance in the grid
management is, however, also a source of concern for the privacy of SM users. In fact, many
appliance load monitoring (ALM) techniques have been developed to gain insights into consumer
behavior, inferring consumers’ habits or preferences, and the number of household occupants.
These privacy concerns are echoed by consumer associations and the media, and even delayed
the SM roll-out in the Netherlands in 2009, which proceeded forward only after the customers
were given the possibility to opt out from the SM installation [4]. Privacy concerns are further
exacerbated by recent legislation, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in
Europe [5], which sets a limit on the collection, use and processing of personal information.
In particular, article 6 of the GDPR clearly states that the user must give explicit consent to
processing of her personal information, and such processing should be limited to only a specific
purpose.
3II. ALM TECHNIQUES
ALM methods are aimed at monitoring a household’s power consumption in order to achieve
a wide range of benefits for the occupants by providing energy consumption data analysis
at the appliance level. ALM techniques provide near real-time feedback on the user’s power
consumption behavior, are able to detect more power-hungry devices, and allow the automation of
demand-side management [6]. Recent improvements in artificial intelligence, data communication
and sensing technologies have made the SM benefits even more evident. ALM techniques can
be divided into non-intrusive and intrusive load monitoring (NILM and ILM, respectively)
techniques. While ILM techniques need to monitor power consumption at multiple points in
a household [7], NILM techniques aim at recognizing the operation of electric loads within
a household without the need to physically monitor each electrical device separately, relying
only on aggregate SM measurements. ILM techniques are generally more accurate than NILM
ones, however, they are also more invasive and expensive to deploy. For this reason, most of
the works analyzing privacy for SM users are focused on NILM techniques, which create the
biggest concern from a privacy point of view as they can be run by using a single probe attached
to the SM and do not need any device to be physically installed within a target household.
The first NILM prototypes were devised in the 80s by George Hart [8]. Since then, NILM
techniques have evolved in various directions, e.g., by considering either low or high-frequency
measurements; by focusing on detecting on/off events by means of either steady state or transient
signatures; or by analyzing the raw SM readings, e.g., by studying their frequency spectra.
Additionally, both supervised and unsupervised machine learning models have been used for
pattern recognition on SM data. Extensive surveys of NILM techniques are provided in [6],
whereas [7] discuss ILM techniques in detail.
III. SM PRIVACY CONCERNS AND PRIVACY-PRESERVING TECHNIQUES
Adoption of SMs and the use of NILM algorithms generate growing concerns about consumer
privacy. An example of a typical power consumption profile along with some detected appliances
is illustrated in Figure 1. It is noteworthy that such precise and accurate information would be
available in principle only if very high frequency SM readings were available to an attacker.
However, even with low frequency SM readings, the attacker may still be able to gain insights into
users’ activities and behaviors, determining, for example, a user’s presence at home, her religious
beliefs, disabilities and illnesses [11]–[13]. Moreover, SM privacy risks could be particularly
4Fig. 1: A power consumption profile where the consumption of some appliances is highlighted
[9] (data retrieved from the Dataport database [10]).
critical for businesses, e.g., factories and data centers, as their power consumption profiles
may reveal sensitive information about the state of their businesses to their competitors. Such
important privacy concerns in the use of SMs has raised significant public attention and they
have been highly debated in the media and by politicians, and, if not properly addressed, they
could represent a major roadblock for this multi-billion dollar industry.
In the following, we adopt the classification introduced in [9], and divide the privacy-preserving
techniques into SM data manipulation (SMDM) techniques, which manipulate SM readings
before reporting them to the UP, and user demand shaping (UDS) techniques, which modify
the actual electricity consumption by shaping it by means of physical devices such as renew-
able energy sources (RESs) or rechargeable batteries (RBs) [9]. The main difference between
these sets of techniques is that while the SMDM techniques report corrupted or incomplete
electrical consumption data to the UP to preserve user’s privacy, the UDS techniques report a
fully correct measurement, which is, however, generated by appropriately filtering the original
user consumption. Hence, the UDS techniques do not typically suffer from the issue of data
mismatch between the UP and the consumer, as opposed to some SMDM techniques, e.g., data
5obfuscation techniques. SMDM techniques have other notable disadvantages compared to UDS
techniques, e.g., an eavesdropper may still be able to measure a user’s consumption by installing
additional probes outside the target household, hence choosing not to rely exclusively on the SM
measurements; or the introduction of trusted third parties (TTPs), considered by many SMDM
approaches, which only shifts the problem of trust from the UPs to the TTPs [9]. Finally, the UDS
techniques allow the UP to have full visibility of user’s consumption data, as opposed to some
SMDM techniques, e.g., data aggregation, anonymization and sharing avoidance techniques. As
a result, UDS techniques do not impact the utility of the SG as the actual consumption data is
always shared with all the relevant stakeholders.
On the other hand, the major disadvantage of UDS techniques is that they require the presence
of a physical device at the household, which can be costly for the user to purchase and install,
such as in the case of RESs and RBs. However, such devices are becoming increasingly available
[14], thanks to government incentives and decreasing cost of solar panels [15], residential RBs,
as well as RBs for electric vehicles [16]. It is noteworthy that sharing RBs and RESs among
multiple users, e.g., within the same neighborhood or block of apartments, results in reduced
installation and operation costs as well as allowing management of the available energy in a
centralized way, leading to a more efficient use of the available resources among multiple users.
Other disadvantages of UDS techniques are that the use of physical sources may impact dynamic
pricing and demand response, and such interaction has not been properly investigated yet. Finally,
the shaping algorithms of the UDS techniques may prevent detecting anomalous consumption
patterns.
Many surveys on SM privacy exist to date, each focusing on different aspects and techniques.
Within the SMDM techniques, [17] provides an overview of data aggregation techniques, whereas
[18] presents an excellent overview of cryptographic techniques and a wide discussion on
privacy requirements and privacy legislation. The earlier survey in [19] discusses mostly SMDM
techniques, whereas the recent magazine article [9] provides a wide review of UDS techniques.
Differently from the previous surveys, the focus of this chapter is to provide an up-to-date
technological review of the most significant SMDM and UDS techniques, without focussing on
legal and normative aspects.
The following analysis considers the possible compromise of SM data, whereas the SM itself
is assumed to be tamper-resistant and trusted as it is equipped with a trusted platform module
(TPM) to store cryptographic keys and to perform cryptographic operations. However, it is
6noteworthy that SMs suffer from physical attacks as well, which can be carried out to manipulate
consumption data or to steal energy, and which can lead to devastating effects such as explosions
[20].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. SMDM techniques are analyzed in
Section IV, whereas UDS techniques are discussed in Section V. Conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
IV. SMDM TECHNIQUES
The main SMDM techniques are data aggregation, obfuscation, anonymization, data shar-
ing prevention and down-sampling. Although these techniques are explained below in distinct
paragraphs for simplicity, many of the described works actually consider various combinations
of these techniques. In the following, we denote random variables and their realizations by
upper case and lower case letters, respectively. Let Xi,t denote the total power requested by the
appliances in a household i at time t, called the user load; and let Yi,t, called the grid load,
denote the electric load that is generated by the application of SMDM techniques to Xi,t, and
which is reported to the UP and the DSO via the SM readings. The objective of the privacy-
preserving policies is to keep Xi,t private and report only a modified version of it, i.e., Yi,t, to
the UP. However, in general, the larger the deviation of Yi,t from Xi,t, the less useful Yi,t is for
the UP or the DSO for optimal grid management and correct user billing. For this reason, for
these techniques it is often of interest to characterize the trade-off between privacy and utility,
e.g., as studied from an information-theoretic point of view in [21]. We remark here that such
trade-off is not typically analyzed within the UDS techniques, as the UDS techniques reshape
the data by means of physical sources, and report to the UP the power that is actually requested
by a household.
A. Data Aggregation Techniques
Data aggregation techniques typically propose solutions where SM measurements are en-
crypted and only the aggregate measurement from K different SMs are revealed to the UP.
Aggregation may be achieved with the help of a TTP, which has perfect knowledge of all SM
readings and sends only the aggregated measurements to the UP, as proposed in [22]. However,
considering a TTP only shifts the problem of trust from one entity (UP) to another (TTP) without
actually solving the SM privacy problem itself. Hence, the most significant data aggregation
7approaches avoid the presence of a centralized TTP, and propose decentralized approaches where
SMs are grouped, e.g., into neighborhoods, and cooperate among themselves to achieve private
system operation. Hybrid approaches also exists, where both a TTP and multiple data collectors
are considered simultaneously [23].
Aggregation techniques typically require a certification authority that verifies the signatures
of single SMs, and the capability of SMs to perform cryptographic operations, e.g., hash func-
tions, symmetric and asymmetric encryption and pseudorandom number generators, which are
performed by a TPM [17]. Homomorphic encryption schemes are often used as they allow the
UP to perform operations on the cyphertexts of encrypted messages without the necessity of
decrypting the messages first, hence keeping the content of the message private. An encryption
scheme is said to be homomorphic over an operation ∗ if Enc(m1)∗Enc(m2) = Enc(m1 ∗m2),
∀m1,m2 ∈ M , where Enc denotes the encryption algorithm and M is the set of all possible
messages. Homomorphic encryption schemes are either partial, e.g., Paillier or ElGamal, which
allow only a certain operation to be performed on the cyphertext, or full, which allow all
operations to be performed but result in high computational complexity [18].
Paillier homomorphic encryption and additive secret sharing can be used so that the total power
consumption is visible to the UP only at a neighborhood level and every SM in the neighborhood
knows only a share of the consumption of all the other SMs [24]. To achieve this, each SM
divides its readings into random shares that are encrypted using the public keys of other SMs in
the neighborhoods. Then, the UP aggregates and encrypts the readings by means of homomorphic
encryption and sends the readings back to the SMs whose public keys were used for encryption.
Finally, each SM decrypts the shares encrypted using its public key, adds its own share, and sends
the aggregated reading back to the UP. Despite its simplicity, this technique is not scalable as the
amount of data increases due to the random shares, and the number of homomorphic encryptions
is O(K2) [17]. Noise Ni,t may be added to individual SM readings to obtain Yi,t = Xi,t +Ni,t,
where the noise is computed so that it cancels out once all the readings from all the SMs in
a neighborhood are aggregated by the UP, i.e.,
∑K
i=1 Yi,t =
∑K
i=1Xi,t [25]. Alternatively, each
SM may output gXi,t+Ni,ti , where gi is the hash of a unique identifier and Ni,t is computed so
that they cancel out when the readings are aggregated, as proposed in [25], where gi and Ni are
derived by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and a bilinear map. However, for
the UP to be able to compute the aggregation, it needs to know gi, ∀i, and an approximation of
the total consumption, and, moreover, this technique results in O(K2) messages, O(K) modulo
8multiplications and O(1) exponentiations [17]. As SM data is inherently very rich and multi-
dimensional, some techniques can be used to improve the efficiency of homomorphic systems
and reduce the computational and communication overhead [26]. A further approach is to allow
all SMs in a neighborhood to perform intermediate incremental and distributed aggregation, by
constructing an aggregation tree rooted at the UP, and using homomorphic encryption to allow
end-to-end secure aggregation so that intermediate aggregations are kept private [27].
Aggregation can also be coupled with differential privacy. A function f is defined to be -
differentially private if, for any datasets D1 and D2, where D1 and D2 differ in at most a single
element, and for all subsets of possible answers S ⊆ Range(f), the following condition holds:
p(f(D1) ∈ S) ≤ e · p(f(D2) ∈ S), where p denotes probability. Hence, differentially private
functions produce similar outputs for inputs that differ on one element only [28]. A function
can be made differentially private by the addition of Laplacian noise L(S(f)/), where S(f)
is the global sensitivity of f . A Laplace distribution can be generated by summing independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) gamma distributed random variables G(K,λ), where λ is
a scale parameter for the Laplace distribution. Hence, L(λ) = ∑Ki=1[G1(K,λ) − G2(K,λ)],
where G1(K,λ) and G2(K,λ) are drawn independently from the same gamma distribution,
i.e., Laplacian noise can be constructed by subtracting gamma distributed random variables.
Hence, to achieve a differentially private operation, each SM adds gamma-distributed noise
to its readings, encrypt them, and send the encrypted measurement to the UP in the form
of Yi,t = Xi,t + G1(K,λ) − G2(K,λ). Moreover, SM data, corrupted by Laplacian noise and
encrypted, can be further aggregated between groups of SMs [29].
Lately, blockchain technology has also been applied to provide privacy to SM users, espe-
cially in the context of data aggregation techniques. The use of blockchain technology, with its
decentralized infrastructure, removes the need for a TTP, and the aggregator, or miner, is chosen
directly from the users within a neighborhood. The miner transmits only the neighborhood
aggregate consumption, and each user may create multiple pseudonyms to hide her identity
[30]. Blockchain has also been considered to provide privacy for users in the context of energy
trading [31].
A general issue with data aggregation techniques is the fact that the UP, or the DSO, is
prevented from having a clear real-time picture of a single premise’s consumption. This can
adversely impact the UP in terms of local grid state estimation using SM readings [32], fault de-
tection at the local level, and ability to implement dynamic pricing to mitigate peak demands [33].
9Moreover, data aggregation techniques typically suffer from the so-called human-factor-aware
attack, whereby an attacker may be able to estimate a user’s consumption from the aggregate if
she knows for example if the user is, or is not, at home [34]. Cryptographic techniques, heavily
used in data aggregation approaches, typically suffer from high computational complexity, key
distribution issues and overhead, and poor scalability, which prevent practical applicability in an
SM setting where computational and bandwidth resources are limited. Additionally, cryptographic
techniques are vulnerable to statistical attacks and power analysis [35].
B. Data Obfuscation Techniques
Data obfuscation revolves around the introduction of noise in the SM readings, i.e., Yi,t =
Xi,t +Ni,t, and many works that propose obfuscation techniques also involve aggregating data.
In fact, as described in Section IV-A, if noise is properly engineered across multiple SMs, the
aggregation at the UP allows the noise to be removed from the sum of the readings so that the
UP is able to retrieve the total power consumption correctly. Alternatively, a simpler solution is
to add noise to each SM independently of other SMs, e.g., by adding noise with a null expected
value so that the expected value of the readings per each pricing period does not change, i.e.,
E[Yi,t] = E[Xi,t] and Var[Yi,t] = Var[Ni,t], as Xi,t is not drawn from a random distribution [22].
The UP is able to retrieve an accurate estimate of the aggregate consumption across a group
of SMs thanks to the convergence in the central limit theorem. This, however, requires a large
number of SMs, which hinders the practical applicability of this technique. More specifically,
the number of SMs that are needed is
(
w·v·Var[Ni,t]
d
)2
, where w is the confidence interval width
of the UP on the aggregate power consumption, v is the maximum peak power used by the
consumer for obfuscation, and d is the allowed average deviation in power consumption at the
household [22].
The amount of obfuscation can be determined directly by the UP, and then distributed across
multiple SMs with the help of a lead meter. A TTP receives the vector of obfuscated measure-
ments, sums them, and sends them to the UP, which is able to retrieve the correct aggregation
value by subtracting the predetermined amount of obfuscation [36]. However, the TTP may
represent a bottleneck for network traffic and, if compromised, may lead to the disclosure of
the original SM readings. To overcome such security and efficiency issues, multiple TTPs can
interact to create obfuscation vectors, which are used by each lead meter in its own subnetwork
[33]. The latter approach, which has also been simulated in an IEEE 802.11s wireless mesh
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network, improves the overall reliability and efficiency but has the obvious disadvantage of
requiring multiple TTPs.
Obfuscation techniques deliberately report incorrect readings to the UP, which creates a
discrepancy between power production and consumption, and which prevents the UP from
quickly reacting to energy outages and thefts and the DSO from properly managing the SG.
As an example of the risks involved with obfuscation techniques consider the optimal power
flow problem, i.e., characterizing the best operating levels for electric power plants to meet
demands while minimizing operating costs. It has been found that noise injection is positively
correlated with the generators’ power output, and the locational marginal price on each bus of the
grid is mostly influenced by the noise applied at links that are in the bus or immediately adjacent
to it [37]. This example shows how injecting noise may have the consequence of undermining
the utility of the SG.
C. Data Anonymization Techniques
Data anonymization is about using pseudonyms to hide SMs’ identities. Different pseudonyms
for the same SM may be used for various functions, e.g., a pseudonym may be allocated for SM
data sent at high frequency, necessary for real-time grid monitoring but more privacy sensitive,
whereas another pseudonym may be allocated for SM data sent at low frequency, e.g., for billing
purposes, and random time intervals are used to reduce correlation between the use of various
pseudonyms [38]. The main problem with this approach is how to link the various pseudonyms
to the same SM, which can be trivially achieved by using a TTP [38]. A disadvantage of these
techniques is that recent advances in machine learning and anomaly detection lead to techniques
that can successfully de-anonymize SM data [39].
D. Data Sharing Prevention Techniques
These techniques propose methods to process SM data locally at a household, without the
need for the readings to be sent to the UP. Hence, the energy bill is computed directly at the
household or on any device trusted by the consumer on the basis of publicly accessible tariffs,
while only the final bill is revealed to the UP. The issue of SM data privacy does not arise, since
user’s data never leaves the household, and there is no need for sensitive data to be stored at
the UP premises as well. Zero-knowledge proofs [40] are employed so that the UP can verify
the integrity of the bill, and SM signatures are used to prove the identity of the sender [41].
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As an example, Pedersen commitments can be used in the form Commit(xi,t, ri,t), where ri,t
is generated by using known Pedersen generators. These commitments are sent along with the
total energy bill over T time slots (TSs) based on the specific time-of-use (ToU) tariff employed,
C =
∑T
t=1 xi,tct, where ct is the power cost at TS t [42]. Alternatively, non-interactive zero-
knowledge techniques can be used along with Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures [43], which
can be applied to more complicated non-linear ToU tariffs, i.e., tariffs that change after exceeding
certain consumption thresholds [44].
Data sharing prevention techniques may solve the basic problem of metering for billing,
however, they cannot be applied in more dynamic scenarios where energy cost changes quickly
over short periods of time based on user demands, or when considering demand side management
and demand response. Also, these techniques do not solve the privacy problem when SM data
needs to be necessarily shared for grid management purposes, e.g., with the DSO.
E. Data Downsampling Techniques
Alternatively, it is possible to reduce the user load sampling rate, so that the UP receives less
frequent SM readings. However, the less frequent the SM readings, the harder it is for the UP
(or the DSO) to accomplish their duties. As the SG scenario can be modelled as a closed-loop
between the UP and the consumer, whereby the UP reacts to SM readings via demand response,
the aim is to minimize the user load sampling rate whilst allowing the closed-loop properties of
the system, e.g., safety, stability and reliability, to hold within acceptable limits [45].
V. UDS TECHNIQUES
Differently from SMDM techniques, UDS techniques report the actual power requested by the
consumer, without any manipulation or the addition of any noise. However, what is reported to
the UP is not the original load demand of the user, but rather a version of it that is modified by
means of the power exchanged with an additional physical device that is present at the household,
e.g., an RB or an RES.
In the following we adopt the same discrete-time SM system model of [9], which is represented
in Figure 2. Xt ∈ X and Yt ∈ Y denote the total user load and the grid load at TS t, respectively,
where X and Y denote the user load and grid load alphabets, respectively. Each TS duration is
normalized to unit time, allowing the use of power and energy values interchangeably within a
TS. Also, the user and grid loads are assumed to be constant within a TS, hence representing a
12
Fig. 2: Representation of the system model [9]. Xt, Yt, Et and Bt denote the consumer’s energy
demand, i.e., the user load, the SM readings, i.e., the grid load, the energy produced by the RES,
and the level of energy in the RB at TS t, respectively. The meter readings being reported to
the UP are shown by the dashed line. The energy management unit (EMU) is the physical or
logical unit where the privacy-preserving algorithm resides.
discrete-time linear approximation of a continuous load profile, whose accuracy can be arbitrarily
increased by reducing the TS duration. Since the aim of the UDS techniques is to protect the
privacy of customers from the UP, the DSO, and all the SG parties that may be able to access
near real-time power consumption information, the TSs in this model do not correspond to the
sampling intervals used for transmitting SM measurements to the UP, but rather to the shorter
time intervals that are used to request the actual power from the grid [9].
Depending on the user’s priorities, part of the demand may not necessarily be satisfied
immediately but only by a certain deadline, e.g., fully charging the electric vehicle by 8 a.m.,
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with no specific requirement on the exact time the load needs to take place. Hence, some works
explore load shifting techniques that allow part of the user load to be shifted to a later time,
appropriately called elastic demand, which may be applicable for loads including electric vehicle
charging, and dishwasher and clothes washer-dryer cycles. This flexibility allows the consumer
to employ demand response to increase her privacy as well as to lower the energy cost.
The electricity unit cost at TS t, Ct, can be modeled as a random variable, or in accordance
with a specific ToU tariff, and the total cost incurred by a user to purchase Yt units of power
over a time interval of τt at the price of Ct is thus given by τtYtCt.
a) Physical Resources: RBs and RESs: Some of the UDS techniques consider an RB for
shaping the grid load, so that the difference between the user and the grid load, Xt − Yt, is
retrieved from the RB. The amount of energy stored in the RB at TS t is Bt ∈ [0, Bmax], where
Bmax denotes the maximum RB capacity, while the RB charging and discharging processes
may be constrained by the so-called charging and discharging power constraints Pˆc and Pˆd,
respectively, i.e., −Pˆc ≤ Xt − Yt ≤ Pˆd, ∀t, and additional losses in the battery charging and
discharging processes may be taken into account to model a more realistic energy management
system. The battery wear and tear due to charging and discharging can also be considered and
modeled as a cost variable [46]. Some works also consider a less stringent constraint on the
average power that can be retrieved from an RB P¯ , i.e., E
[
1
n
∑n
t=1(Xt − Yt)
] ≤ P¯ . Where
an RESs is considered, the renewable energy generated at TS t is denoted by Et ∈ E , where
E = [0, Emax] depending on the type of energy source. The amount of energy in the RB at TS
t+ 1, Bt+1, can be computed on the basis of Bt as
Bt+1 = min
{
Bt + Et − (Xt − Yt), Bmax
}
. (1)
Works that characterize theoretical expressions or bounds for the level of privacy achieved in
SM systems typically consider the random processes X and E to be Markov or made up of
sequences of i.i.d. random variables. Some works also study the scenario where the UP knows
the realizations of the renewable energy process E, which may occur if, for example, the UP
has access to additional information from sensors deployed near the household that measure
various parameters, e.g., solar or wind power intensity, and if it knows the specifications of the
user’s renewable energy generator, e.g., model and size of the solar panel. It is noteworthy that
RBs and RESs can be used for both privacy protection and cost minimization, and using them
jointly greatly increase the potential benefits. For example, from a cost-saving perspective, the
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user may be able to use the generated renewable energy when electricity is more expensive to
buy from the grid, and may even be able to sell surplus energy to grid.
b) The Energy Management Policy (EMP): The EMP f , implemented by the EMU, decides
on the grid load at any TS t based on the previous values of the user load X t, renewable energy
Et, level of energy in the battery Bt, and grid load Y t−1, i.e.,
ft : X t × E t × Bt × Y t−1 → Y , ∀t, (2)
where f ∈ F , and F denotes the set of feasible policies, i.e., policies that produce grid load
values satisfying the RB and RES constraints at any time, as well as the battery update equation
(1). The EMP is chosen so that it optimizes the user privacy along with other targets, e.g., the
cost of energy or the amount of wasted energy, and it has to satisfy the user demand. The EMP
in (2) can be analyzed either as an online EMP, which only considers information available
causally right up to the current time to make a decision, or as an offline EMP, in which case
the future user load values are assumed to be known in a non-causal fashion. Although online
algorithms are more realistic and relevant for real-world applications, offline algorithms may
still lead to interesting intuition or bounds on the performance, and non-causal knowledge of the
electricity price process as well of power consumption for large appliances such as refrigerators,
boilers, heating and electric vehicles may still be considered valid.
A number of privacy measures and techniques have been proposed in the literature, each
with its own advantages and drawbacks. In the following we review the most significant ap-
proaches, and distinguish between heuristic and theoretically-grounded techniques [9]. Since
NILM algorithms look for sudden changes in the grid load profile yt − yt−1, and assign them
to specific electric appliances’ on/off events, the so-called features [47], heuristic techniques are
aimed at minimizing such changes in the grid load. However, since these approaches counter
specific NILM techniques, the validity of their privacy guarantees are also limited only against
these attacks, and they do not provide theoretical assurances on the amount of privacy that
can be achieved. On the contrary, theoretically-grounded techniques typically provide a rigorous
definition of privacy measure, and characterize ways to achieve privacy providing theoretical
guarantees under that measure. However, their practical implementation may be harder to achieve
and demonstrate.
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Fig. 3: Examples of user load, grid load, and target load profiles when considering a constant
target load profile [9]. In this figure the “distance” between the grid load and the target load,
Yt −Wt, is highlighted. The algorithms presented in this section are aimed at minimizing the
average squared distance.
A. Heuristic Privacy Measures: Variations in the Grid Load Profile
Generating a completely flat (equivalently, deterministic) or a completely random (independent
of the user load) grid load profile can provide privacy against NILM algorithms. However, this
could be achievable in practice only by having a very large RB or a very powerful RES, or
by requesting more power than needed from the UP, both options being potentially extremely
costly for the consumer. In the following we describe various EMPs on the basis of the privacy
measure or the specific technique being adopted.
1) Optimization Techniques: A possible solution to reducing the variations in the grid load
profile is to set up an appropriate constant target load profile W and try to match it over time.
The capability of a privacy-preserving algorithm is then measured by how tight this match is,
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i.e., how small the variance of the grid load Y is around W [48]:
VT , 1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[
(Yt −W )2
]
, (3)
where the expectation is over Xt and Yt, and W = E[X] may be considered. In fact, in the
limiting scenario where the target load profile is completely flat this would be equivalent to
leaking only the average power consumption to the UP, unless more power than that needed
by the consumer has been requested. This scenario is shown in Figure 3, where the solid line
represents the user load, the dashed line represents the constant target load profile, and the dotted
line represents the actual grid load profile. Additionally, also the cost of energy, expressed by
the following equation, may need to be minimized:
CT , 1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[
CtYt
]
. (4)
A solution to the joint optimization of Eqs. (3) and (4) can be characterized for an offline
framework, where the optimal privacy and cost of energy can be found as the points on the Pareto
boundary of the convex region formed by all the cost and privacy leakage pairs by solving the
following convex optimization problem [48]:
min
Yt≥0
T∑
t=1
[
(1− α)YtCt + α(Yt −W )2
]
, (5)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 strikes the trade-off between privacy and cost of energy, which can be set up
by the user. The solution to Eq. (5) has a water-filling interpretation with a variable water level
due to to the instantaneous power constraints. When modelling the battery wear and tear caused
by charging and discharging the RB, the optimization can be expressed as [46]:
min
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[
CtYt + 1B(t)CB + α(Yt −W )2
]
, (6)
where 1B(t) = 1 if the battery is charging/discharging at time t, and 0 otherwise and CB is the
battery operating cost due to the battery wear and tear caused by charging and discharging the
RB; and the expectation in (6) is over the probability distributions of all the involved random
variables, i.e., Xt, Yt, and Ct. The solution to Eq. (6) has been characterized for an online
setting by means of a Lyapunov function with a perturbed weight and by adopting the drift-
plus-penalty framework, which consists of the simultaneous minimization of a so-called drift,
i.e., the difference in the level of energy in the RB at successive time instants, and of a penalty
function, i.e., the optimization target itself. The solution to this problem leads to a mixed-integer
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Fig. 4: Examples of user load, grid load, and target load profiles over the course of a day when
considering a piecewise target load profile [9], [50]. The arrows highlight the various price
periods. Note that the target assumes a different constant value for each price period. Electricity
consumption data retrieved from the UK-Dale dataset [51].
nonlinear program, which can be solved by decomposing the problem into multiple cases and
solving each of them separately [46]. With a similar approach, it is possible to constrain the grid
load to be within a certain maximum range λ of an average historical load Y¯ at any TS, i.e.,
λ ≤ Y (t)− Y¯ ≤ λ [49]. In the latter work, load shifting is analyzed to exploit the possibility of
shifting non-urgent appliances to improve the privacy-cost trade-off, and an anomaly detection
method is developed to detect attacks on the electricity prices publicized to consumers.
Matching a completely constant target load profile is not feasible most of the time as that
would require the user to have a large RB or RES. Additionally, it would conflict with the
cost saving objective as the constant target load completely disregards any ToU tariff. Instead,
it would be reasonable to assume that a user would prefer to request more electricity over
less expensive TSs compared to more expensive TSs. To allow such flexibility, one can set a
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Fig. 5: Privacy-cost trade-off when using a Powervault G200-LI-4KWH RB [52] and adopting
the strategies characterized in [48] and [50].
piece-wise constant target load profile, as shown in Figure 4 [50]. Accordingly, the optimization
problem can be expressed as
min
Yt,W (i)
M∑
i=1
t
c(i)
−1∑
t=t
c(i−1)
[
α(Yt −W (i))2 + (1− α)YtC(i)
]
, (7)
where C(i) and W (i) are the cost of the energy purchased from the UP and the target profile
level during the i-th price period, respectively, where 1 ≤ i ≤M , M is the total number of price
periods during time T , and the i-th price period spans from time slot tc(i−1) to tc(i) . As expected,
considering a piece-wise constant target profile allows the system to reach a better privacy-cost
trade-off compared to a constant target profile, as shown in Figure 5, and allowing energy to be
sold to the grid improves the trade-off even further [50]. However, it is noteworthy that adopting
a piece-wise constant target profile introduces an inherent information leakage compared to a
constant target load profile that is not fully captured by the trade-off in Figure 5.
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(a) SHM, no energy selling. (b) LHM, no energy selling.
(c) SHM, energy selling. (d) LHM, energy selling.
Fig. 6: Power profiles for the SHM and the LHM scenarios, α = 0.5 and HF = HP = 2 hours
[53]. Off-peak, medium and peak price periods for the electricity cost are denoted by increasingly
darker arrows.
The adoption of a piece-wise constant target load profile has also been studied in a more realis-
tic scenario, called the short horizon model (SHM), in which the consumer’s future consumption
profile is known to the EMU only for the next HF TSs, and where a moving or receding horizon
model is considered [53]. Let t+HF , min{t + HF , T}, and let t−HP , max{t − HP , 0}.
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(a) SHM. (b) LHM.
Fig. 7: Power profiles when considering a filtered target load with cut-off frequency of 0.1mHz,
α = 1, and HF = HP = 2 hours [53].
Then, the optimization problem is formulated as
min
Y
t+HF
t ,Wt
α
t+HF∑
τ=t−HP
(Yτ −Wt)2 + (1− α)
t+HF∑
τ=t
YτCτ , (8)
which states that at TS t the EMP produces the optimal grid load for the current TS and the
prediction horizon Y t+HFt , and the optimal target load for the current time Wt. It is noteworthy
that the SM remembers the consumption that occurred during the previous HP TSs, considered
in the term
∑t−1
τ=t−HP (Yτ −Wt)2, to ensure a smooth variation of the overall target load profile.
Figure 6 compares the load profiles of the SHM (Figures 6a and 6c) and the offline scenario,
called the long horizon model (LHM) (Figures 6b and 6d) over the course of one day, also
including the scenario where energy can be sold to the grid. The LHM results in a flatter grid
load profile compared to the SHM, however, the SHM is also able to flatten the consumption
peaks to some extent and the resulting peaks in the grid load are not aligned with the original
peaks in the user load [53].
Another target profile that has been considered is a low-pass filtered version of the user load,
as high frequency components in the grid load are more sensitive compared to low frequency
components since they leak more information about a user’s activities [54]. The optimization
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problem for this scenario can be expressed as [53]
min
Y
t+HF
t
α
t+HF∑
τ=t
(Yτ −Wτ )2 + (1− α)
t+HF∑
τ=t
YτCτ , (9)
where Wt,Wt+1, . . . ,Wt+HF are obtained as low-pass filtered versions of the user load. Figure
7 shows the power profiles for the SHM and LHM settings and a filtered user load as the target
load profile. Compared to the previous scenarios, the almost perfect match between grid and
target load profiles in this setting is noteworthy.
2) Temporal and Spatial Similarities in the Grid Load as Privacy Measures: Let Na be the
total number of electrical appliances in a household, then Xt =
∑Na
a Xa,t and Yt =
∑Na
a Ya,t,
where Xa,t and Ya,t are the user and grid loads generated by the a-th appliance. Other approaches
to flattening the grid load are minimizing the difference in the power profile of each single
appliance across all other TSs, i.e., the quantity
∑T
t=1,t6=t0 |Ya,t − Ya,t0 |, ∀a, t0; minimizing the
difference in the power profile of every combination of two appliances in the same TS, i.e.,
the quantity
∑Na−1
a=1
∑Na
j=a+1 |Ya,t − Yj,t|, ∀t, a; and minimizing the difference in the aggregated
power profile over consecutive TSs, i.e., the quantity
∑T−1
t=1
∣∣∣∑Naa=1 Ya,t+1 − Ya,t∣∣∣ [55]. In an online
optimization framework, the former quantities are computed by estimating the future electricity
prices and consumption by means of Monte Carlo simulations, and the optimal solution is
characterized through a rolling online stochastic optimization process and by means of load
shifting.
3) Markov Decision Process (MDP) Formulation: The SM privacy problem can be cast as
an MDP, where the X and E processes are modeled as Markov processes, and the information
leaked about a user is included within the cost incurred by the MDP. The state of the MDP at
time t is typically given by a combination of the energy currently available in the RB Bt, the
user demand Xt, and the renewable energy generated Et, whereas the action ut, expressed by
the EMP, is given by the amount of power demanded from the grid, Yt, and the energy used
from the RB and RES, as a function of the current state. The state transitions are given by the
transitions in the user demand, renewable energy generation, and the battery update equation.
The target of an MDP is to determine the policy that can minimize the average, or discounted
cost for every possible state, by considering either a finite or an infinite horizon setting. The
MDP can be characterized by formulating the optimal Bellman optimality equations [56], which
can be solved to obtain the optimal EMP at each state and time instant. One of the prerequisites
necessary to formulate a problem as an MDP is to have a cost that is additive over time, i.e.,
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the total cost is computed as the summation of the costs incurred at different TSs. An additive
formulation for the SM privacy loss is natural when the privacy loss is expressed as the variance
of the user load with respect to a target load, but it is more challenging when considering other
measures, e.g., mutual information [9].
When the loss of privacy is measured by the fluctuations of the grid load around a constant
target load, and the joint optimization of privacy and cost is considered, the SM problem can be
cast as an MDP [57]. Q-learning [58], an iterative algorithm that computes the expected cost for
each state-action pair by alternating exploitation and exploration phases, can be adopted when
the transition probabilities p(Xt|Xt−1) and p(Bt|Bt−1, ut) are not known or stochastic, which is
typically the case in the SM setting.
4) Heuristic Algorithms: One intuitive approach to SM privacy is battery charging and dis-
charging algorithms that keep the grid load as constant as possible. For example, the RB could be
discharged (charged) when the current user load is larger (smaller) than that at the previous TS,
which would hide the higher frequency components of the user load [59]. In [59], the differences
between the resulting grid and user load distributions are measured by computing the empirical
relative entropy, by clustering SM data according to power levels, or by using cross-correlation
and regression procedures, i.e., shifting the grid load in time to reach the point of maximum
cross-correlation with the user load and using regression methods to compare the two aligned
power profiles [59].
A more advanced method is to consider multiple grid load target values and let the EMP
maintain the grid load to be equal to one of these values [60]. In [60] one main target value is
considered for the grid load to match, called the steady state target, and high and low recovery
states are introduced, which are matched by the grid load in case of persistent light or heavy
user demand, respectively. When this happens, strategies similar to those employed in [61] are
used to modify the steady state target load to permit the RB to be charged or discharged, and an
exponentially weighted moving average of the demand is used to update the steady state target
load to reduce the occurrences of recovery states.
However, these intuitive algorithms suffer from load change recovery attacks that can identify
peaks of user demand [62]. The use of a steady state target load and high and low recovery states
can be generalized by considering an arbitrary number of steady states, as this is equivalent to
considering a larger number of quantization levels for the user load [62]. Such a “stepping”
EMP results in an irreversible process since quantization is a “many-to-few” mapping. Let β
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be the step size that satisfies the RB maximum capacity and power constraints, and let ht be
an integer, so that yt = htβ. The grid load is chosen between the quantization levels that are
adjacent to the user load, i.e.,
⌈
xt
β
⌉
and
⌊
xt
β
⌋
, where
⌈·⌉ and ⌊·⌋ denote the ceiling and floor
functions, respectively. Various stepping algorithms are studied in [62]: one that keeps the grid
load constant for as long as possible; one that keeps charging (discharging) the RB until it is full
(empty); and another that chooses its actions at random. Despite being thoroughly analyzed, it
is difficult to determine the levels of privacy these stepping algorithms can achieve, given their
heuristic nature. Additionally, heuristic schemes may be based on deterministic schemes, which
make them easier to be reverse-engineered.
B. Theoretical Guarantees on SM Privacy
Above all, being able to provide theoretical guarantees or assurances on the level of privacy
that can be achieved in an SM scenario is of utmost importance. Such guarantees should
be completely independent of any assumption on the attacker’s capabilities, e.g., the NILM
algorithms employed or the amount of computational resources available, so that their validity
can be absolute. Theoretically-grounded methods would also make it easier to compare the level
of privacy achieved in various scenarios, e.g., using RBs of various capacities or RESs of various
power outputs. In order to be able to achieve theoretical formulations, these techniques typically
assume that the statistics of the user load and renewable energy process are stationary over time
and known to the EMU, which is reasonable if these can be learned over a sufficiently long
period of time [63]–[65]. Additionally, most of the works in this area also develop suboptimal
policies that are applied to real power traces, which allow the reader to gain an intuition on the
proposed techniques. Finally, the worst-case approach of considering the statistics governing the
random processes to be known to the attacker is followed, which further strengthens the privacy
guarantees.
Theoretical analysis studies the performance of SM privacy over long time horizons, focusing
on the average user information leaked over time and its asymptotic behavior. Since the problem
complexity increases with time, one of the challenges of the theoretical analysis is to find “single-
letter” expressions for the optimal solutions, which would significantly reduce the complexity.
However, the model needs to be simplified, e.g., by considering an i.i.d. or Markov user load or
RES generation, to be able to obtain closed-form or single-letter expressions for the information
leaked in an SM system.
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Mutual Information (MI) as a Privacy Measure: The entropy of a random variable X , H(X),
measures the uncertainty of its realizations, whereas the MI between random variables X and
Y , I(X;Y ), measures the amount of information shared between the two random variables
and the dependance between them. I(X;Y ) ranges between zero, if X and Y are independent,
and H(X) = H(Y ) if X and Y are completely dependent [66]. Additionally, I(X;Y ) can be
interpreted as the average reduction in uncertainty of X given the knowledge of Y , hence lending
itself perfectly as a measure of the information shared between the user load and the grid load
processes Xn and Y n. For an SM system with only an RB (no RES) and a given EMP f in (2),
running over n time slots, the average information leakage rate Inf (Bmax, Pˆd) is defined as [9]
Inf (Bmax, Pˆd) ,
1
n
I(Xn;Y n) =
1
n
[
H(Xn)−H(Xn|Y n)], (10)
where 0 ≤ Xt−Yt ≤ Pˆd. It is noteworthy that the privacy achieved according to Eq. (10) depends
on the RB capacity Bmax and on the discharging peak power constraint Pˆd. The minimum
information leakage rate, In(Bmax, Pˆd), is obtained by minimizing (10) over all feasible policies
f ∈ F .
a) Privacy with an RES only: Consider first the SM system of Figure 2 with an RES
but no RB, and without the possibility of selling the generated renewable energy to the UP, in
order to fully analyze the impact of the RES on the SM privacy. Hence, for an i.i.d. user load,
the minimum information leakage rate is characterized by the so-called privacy-power function
I(P¯ , Pˆd), and can be formulated in the following single-letter form:
I(P¯ , Pˆ ) = inf
pY |X∈P
I (X;Y ) , (11)
where P , {pY |X : y ∈ Y ,E[(X − Y )] ≤ P¯ , 0 ≤ X − Y ≤ Pˆ}. If X is discrete, i.e., X can
assume countable values that are multiples of a fixed quantum, the grid load alphabet can be
constrained to the user load alphabet without loss of optimality, and since the MI is a convex
function of pY |X ∈ P , the privacy-power function can be written as a convex optimization
problem with linear constraints [67], [68]. Numerical solutions for the optimal conditional
distribution can be found using algorithms such as the Blahut-Arimoto (BA) algorithm [66].
When X is continuous, i.e., X can assume all real values within the limits specified by the
constraints, the Shannon lower bound, a computable lower bound on the rate-distortion function
widely used in the literature, is shown to be tight for exponential user load distributions [68],
[69]. Two interesting observations can be made about the solution to Eq. (11). First, the EMP
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that minimizes Eq. (11) is stochastic and memoryless, that is, the optimal grid load at each
time slot is generated randomly via the optimal conditional probability that minimizes (11) by
considering only the current user load. Secondly, Eq. (11) has an expression similar to the well-
known rate-distortion function R(D) in information theory, which characterizes the minimum
compression rate R of data, in bits per sample, that is required for a receiver to reconstruct
a source sequence within a specified average distortion level D [66]. Shannon computed the
following single-letter form for the rate-distortion function for an i.i.d. source X ∈ X with
distribution pX , reconstruction alphabet Xˆ , and distortion function d(xˆ, x), where the distortion
between sequences Xn and Xˆn is given by 1
n
∑n
i=1 d(xi, xˆi):
R(D) = min
pXˆ|X :
∑
(x,xˆ) pXpXˆ|Xd(x,xˆ)≤D
I(Xˆ;X). (12)
Hence, tools from rate distortion theory can be used to evaluate Eq. (11). However, it is
important to highlight that there are conceptual differences between the two settings, namely that
i) in the SM privacy problem Y n is the direct output of the encoder rather than the reconstruction
at the decoder side; and ii) unlike the lossy source encoder, the EMU does not operate over
blocks of user load realizations; instead, it operates symbol by symbol, acting instantaneously
after receiving the appliance load at each time slot.
An interesting extension to this problem is to consider a multi-user scenario where K users,
each equipped with a single SM, share the same RES, and the objective is to jointly minimize
the total privacy loss of all consumers [68]. The average information leakage rate has the same
expression in (10) where X and Y are replaced byXt = [X1,t, . . . , XK,t] andYt = [Y1,t, . . . , YK,t]
and the privacy-power function has the same expression in (11). When the user loads are
independent, but not necessarily identically distributed, the optimization problem (ignoring the
peak power constraint) can be cast as [68]
I(P¯ ) = inf∑K
i=1 Pi≤P¯
K∑
i=1
IXi(Pi), (13)
where IXi(·) denotes the privacy-power function for the i-th user having user load distribution
pXi(xi). Moreover, it is found that the reverse water-filling algorithm determines the optimal
allocation of renewable energy for continuous and exponential user loads.
b) Privacy with an RB only: In this section an RB only is considered to be present in
the SM system, which is thus charged only via the grid. Including an RB in the SM setting
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complicates significantly the problem as the RB introduces memory in time, and the EMP needs
to consider the impact of its decisions not only in the current TS but also in the future.
As discussed above, this problem can be cast as an MDP upon determining an additive
formulation for the privacy loss. This can be achieved by formulating the optimization problem
as follows [70]:
L∗ , min
f
1
n
I(B1, X
n;Y n), (14)
and by adopting an EMP that decides on the grid load based only on the current user load, level
of energy in the RB and past values of the grid load, which does not lose optimality as the
following inequality holds:
1
n
I(Xn, B1;Y
n) ≥ 1
n
n∑
t=1
I(Xt, Bt;Yt|Y t−1). (15)
Additionally, to avoid an exponential growth in the space of possible conditional distributions
in Eq. (15), the knowledge of Y t−1 is summarized into a belief state p(Xt, Bt|Y t−1), which is
computed recursively and can be interpreted as the belief that the UP has about (Xt, Bt) at TS t,
given its past observations, Y t−1. The minimum information leakage rate has been characterized
in a single-letter expression for an i.i.d. user load, resulting in an i.i.d. grid load and a memoryless
EMP, both for a binary user load [71] and for a generic size for the user load [70], [72], [73].
The level of energy in the RB can be modeled as a trapdoor channel, which is a type of unifilar
finite state channel, i.e., its output and state at any time depend only on the current input and the
previous state, and its state is deterministic given the previous state and the current input and
output [74]. Let a certain number of balls, labeled as either “0” or “1”, be within the channel. At
each TS a new ball is inserted into the channel and an output ball is randomly selected from those
within the channel. In an SM context, inserting or removing a ball from the channel represents
charging or discharging the RB, respectively. An upper bound on the information leakage rate
achieved using this model can be determined by minimizing the information leakage rate over
the set of stable output balls, i.e., the set of feasible output sequences Y n that can be extracted
from the channel given a certain initial state and an input sequence Xn, and by taking inspiration
from codebook construction strategies in [75]. This upper bound is expressed as follows [76]:
1
n
I(Xn;Y n) ≤ 1b(Bmax + 1)/Xmaxc , (16)
where Xmax is the largest value X can assume. It is also shown in [76] that the average user
energy consumption determines the level of achievable privacy.
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Above all, it is important to jointly optimize the user’s privacy and cost of energy, which allows
characterization of the optimal trade-offs between privacy and cost. Since cost of energy has an
immediate additive formulation, it can also be easily embedded within the MDP formulation.
Let Ct = (C1, . . . , Ct) be the random price sequence over t TSs. Then, user privacy can be
defined in the long time horizon as [61]
P , lim
t→∞
H(X t|Y t, Ct)
t
. (17)
Two solutions to the problem (17) are presented in [61], the most interesting of which proposes
a battery centering approach aimed at keeping the RB at a medium level of charge so that the
EMU is less constrained by the RB or the user load in determining the grid load. Then, the
aim is to keep the system in a so-called hidden state where the grid load depends only on the
current cost of energy but not on the user load or the level of energy in the battery.
c) Privacy with both an RES and an RB: The most interesting scenario, as well as the
most challenging, is when both an RES and an RB are considered. First, considering either the
absence of an RB or the presence of an infinite capacity RB allows us to characterize bounds on
the performance of systems with finite capacity RBs. Figure 8 shows the minimum information
leakage rate with respect to the renewable energy generation rate pe [77], [78]. When Bmax = 0,
the renewable energy that can be used at any TS is limited by the amount of renewable energy
generated within that TS, and the privacy performance seriously degrades if the UP further knows
the amount of renewable energy generated, as shown in Figure 8. The case when Bmax = ∞
is analogous to the average and peak power-constrained scenario, and no loss of privacy is
experienced when the UP knows the exact amount of renewable energy generated. The lower
bound is achieved by two different EMPs in [77].
Modelling a finite capacity RB is challenging due to the memory effects, and for this reason
single-letter expressions for the general setting are still lacking. Nevertheless, the problem may
be cast as an MDP by measuring privacy via the MI and by formulating the corresponding
Bellman equations [79]. Additionally, the privacy-cost trade-off may be analyzed as an MDP,
as investigated in [80], where a numerical solution focusing on a renewable energy process that
recharges the RB fully at random time instances is presented, as well as a lower bound where
the user knows non-causally the time when the RES recharges the RB.
1) Detection Error Probability as a Privacy Measure: In some scenarios the user may want
to keep private only specific activities, e.g., the fact that she is eating microwaved food or if
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Fig. 8: Minimum information leakage rate with respect to the renewable energy generation rate
pe with X = E = Y = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and Bmax = {0, 1, 2,∞} [77]. The leakage for Bmax =∞
has been found by setting Pˆ = 4. The curves for Bmax = {0,∞} are obtained analytically,
whereas the curves for the finite battery capacities Bmax = {1, 2} are obtained numerically by
considering a suboptimal EMP.
there is an active burglar alarm. Considering M possible hypotheses related to the activity that
is to be kept private, this problem can be modelled as an M -ary hypothesis test, where H ∈
H = {h0, h1, . . . hM−1}. A binary hypothesis test occurs when M = 2, e.g., when answering the
question “is the consumer using the oven”, and, by convention, the null hypothesis h0 represents
the absence of some factor or condition, e.g., “the consumer is not using the oven”, while the
alternative hypothesis h1 is the complementary condition, e.g., “the consumer is using the oven”.
Typically, it is assumed that the user load has different statistics under these two hypotheses,
i.e., the energy demand at TS t is i.i.d. with pX|h0 (respectively, pX|h1) under hypothesis h0
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(respectively, h1).
An attacker wishes to determine the best mapping Hˆ(·) between the grid load and the
underlying hypothesis, so that the set of all possible SM readings Yn is partitioned into the two
disjoint decision regions A0 , {yn|Hˆ(yn) = h0} and A1 , {yn|Hˆ(yn) = h1}, corresponding to
the subsets of the SM readings for which the UP decides for one of the two hypotheses. When
performing a decision, the attacker may incur two types of errors:
• Type I error probability: make a decision h1 when h0 is the true hypothesis (false positive
or false alarm), i.e., pI = pY n|h1(A0);
• Type II error probability: make a decision h0 when h1 is the true hypothesis (false negative
or miss), i.e., pII = pY n|h0(A1).
One possible solution to this mapping problem is to perform a Neyman-Pearson test on the
grid load, i.e., characterizing the minimum type II error probability pminII while fixing a maximum
type I error probability, and making decisions by thresholding the likelihood ratio
pY n|h0 (y
n|h0)
pY n|h1 (y
n|h1) .
Consider the worst case of an attacker that has perfect knowledge of the EMP employed, the
asymptotic regime n → ∞, and, for the sake of simplicity, a memoryless EMP. Then, pminII is
linked to the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence D(·||·) by the Chernoff-Stein Lemma [66]:
lim
n→∞
− log p
min
II
n
= D(pY |h0||pY |h1), (18)
where the KL divergence between two probability distribution functions on X , pX and qX ,
is defined as D(pX ||qX) ,
∑
x∈X pX(x) log
pX(x)
qX(x)
[66]. Hence, to maximize the consumer’s
privacy the goal of an EMP is to find the optimal grid load distributions, which, given X and
the true hypothesis h, minimize the KL divergence in Eq. (18), or equivalently, the asymptotic
exponential decay rate of pminII . When considering a constraint on the average RES that can be
used, the problem can be cast as
min
pY |H∈PY |H
D(pY |h0||pY |h1), (19)
where PY |H is the set of feasible EMPs, i.e., those that satisfy the average RES generation rate
P¯ , so that 1
n
E[
∑n
i=1Xi − Yi|hj] ≤ P¯ , j = 0, 1. Asymptotic single-letter expressions for two
privacy-preserving EMPs when the probability of type I error is close to 1 are characterized in
[81].
2) Fisher Information (FI) as a Privacy Measure: Let θ be a parameter that underpins the
distribution of some sample data X . Then, FI is a statistical measure of the amount of information
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that X contains about θ. FI can be cast in the SM setting by letting Y n be the sample data and
Xn the parameter underlying the sample data [82]. The FI can be generalized to the multivariate
case by the FI matrix, defined as
FI(Xn) =
∫
Y n∈Yn
p(Y n|Xn)
[
∂ log(p(Y n|Xn))
∂Xn
][
∂ log(p(Y n|Xn))
∂Xn
]T
dY n. (20)
If an unbiased estimator is deployed by the attacker, which produces an estimate Xˆn for Xn,
then the variance of the estimation error is limited by the Crame´r-Rao bound as follows:
E[||Xn − Xˆn(Y n)||22] ≥ Tr(FI(Xn)−1), (21)
where || · ||22 denotes the squared Euclidean norm, and Tr(A) denotes the trace of a matrix A.
Then, to maximize the privacy it is necessary to maximize the right hand side of Eq. (21).
Two settings with an RB can be considered, specifically when the battery charging policy is
independent of the user load, and when it is dependent non-causally on the entire user load
sequence [82], [83].
3) Empirical MI as a Privacy Measure: Empirical MI can be used to evaluate numerically
the information leakage in an SM system, by considering a “large enough” time interval and
sampling the resulting Xn and Y n sequences [84]. The empirical MI between two sequences xn
and yn is
I(X;Y ) ≈ − 1
n
log p(yn)− 1
n
log p(xn) +
1
n
log p(xn, yn), (22)
where p(yn), p(xn) and p(xn, yn) are calculated recursively through a sum-product computation.
Typically, when using this technique the RB is modeled as a finite state machine, whose transition
probabilities are discretized and optimized. A binary RB and an i.i.d. Bernoulli distributed user
demand has been studied in [85]. Additionally, the presence of an RES has been included, and
the privacy-energy efficiency trade-off for a binary scenario and equiprobable user load and
renewable energy generation processes has been characterized [86]. When the RB and RES are
both present, a suboptimal EMP has also been analyzed, which, at each TS, decides among using
all of the available energy, half of it, or no energy at all [77], [78]. Empirical MI normalized
by the empirical entropy of the user load has also been considered [87]. Although assuming the
user load to be i.i.d. allows the problem to be mathematically tractable, this is clearly not the
case in reality. To overcome this problem, a feature-dependent first-order Markov process can be
considered, where the distribution of the user load at any TS depends on an underlying feature,
e.g., time-of-day, day-of-week, season [88].
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Alternatively, I(X;Y ) can be approximated by the relative frequency of events (Xt, Yt) when
X and Y are considered to be i.i.d. Such a measure has been considered in [89], where a
model-distribution predictive controller is employed, which, for each TS t, decides actions for
a prediction horizon of duration T , i.e., up to time t+ T , considering non-causal knowledge of
the renewable energy generation process, user load and energy prices, while the EMU’s actions,
i.e., the energy that is requested from the grid and the RB, are forecast over the prediction
horizon. It is noteworthy that considering a small prediction horizon prevents the EMU from
fully utilizing the RB capacity, whereas large values for T allow the system to achieve better
privacy-cost trade-offs at the expense of a much higher computational complexity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Privacy, a fundamental and inalienable human right, has never been under so much attack
and scrutiny as in recent years. Reports of mass surveillance by government agencies as well
as private companies have strongly undermined the trust of consumers and the general public.
Moreover, the big data and machine learning revolution is also seen as an improved way to profit
from consumer’s data, which, more often than not, is stored and processed without users’ prior
authorization and even unbeknownst to them. Privacy in SG is no exception to this debate, as
the proliferation of anti SM movements across the world shows. In fact, UPs, DSOs and other
SG entities may not be incentivized enough in keeping user’s data private and in investing in
the creation of privacy-preserving technologies. Hence, it is the task of legislators to strengthen
privacy guarantees around the use of customer’s data by creating new laws that safeguard the
consumers’ right to privacy, e.g., the GDPR in Europe [5]. However, as these legal initiatives
are still limited, it is often up to the research community to investigate and lead the development
and the discussion around privacy-preserving techniques for SMs.
To further inspire research and improvements in this domain, in this chapter we have presented
a broad overview of privacy-preserving techniques in SMs. We have discussed techniques that
manipulate meter readings before sending them to the UP, as well as techniques that adopt
physical resources such as RBs or RESs, and we have discussed their main advantages and lim-
itations. We have described theoretically grounded techniques, which shed light on fundamental
aspects of the SM privacy problem, as well as more empirical techniques, which have a more
immediate practical implementation but tend to provide fewer privacy assurances. Finally, we
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have also presented various measures for privacy in SMs, which look at the SM problem from
various perspectives.
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